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The September Massacres〔Samuel F. Scott and Barry Rothaus, eds. ''Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution 1789-1799'' (1985) Vol. 2 pp 891-97;The classic modern account of the legends and traditions that have accrued, and an appraisal of the sources on which a narrative account can be based, is Pierre Caron, ''Les Massacres de Septembre'' (Paris, 1935).〕 were a wave of killings in Paris (2–7 September 1792) and other cities in late summer 1792, during the French Revolution. There was a fear that foreign and royalist armies would attack Paris and that the inmates of the city's prisons would be freed and join them. Radicals called for preemptive action, especially journalist Jean-Paul Marat, who called on draftees to kill the prisoners before they could be freed.〔Clifford D. Conner, ''Jean-Paul Marat: Tribune of the French Revolution'' (2012) ch 4〕 The action was undertaken by mobs of National Guardsmen and some ''fédérés''; it was tolerated by the city government, the Paris Commune, which called on other cities to follow suit.〔François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), pp 521-22〕 By 6 September, half the prison population of Paris had been summarily executed: some 1200 to 1400 prisoners. Of these 233 were nonjuring Catholic priests who refused to submit to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. However, the great majority of those killed were common criminals. The massacres were repeated in many other French cities.〔Caron 1935, part IV covers comparable events in provincial cities that transpired from July to October 1792.〕 No one was prosecuted for the killings, but the political repercussions first injured the Girondists (who seemed too moderate) and later the Jacobins (who seemed too bloodthirsty).〔Georges Lefebvre, ''The French Revolution: From its Origins to 1793'' (1962), pp 241-44, 269〕 The September Massacres were an iconic event that to this day divides the supporters and opponents of the Revolution. Gwynne Lewis concludes: :The September Massacres mark a watershed in the troubled history of the relationship between ‘the people’ and the political elite in France. Popular violence, provoked by foreign invasion and counter-revolution, would have to be tamed, either by constructing an alternative ‘official’ terror, or by puncturing, once and for all, this myth of a universal, revolutionary will. The Jacobin Terror of 1793-4 was a product, not so much of Enlightenment theorizing as of war, and the related twin political forces unleashed by the Revolution itself, popular radicalism and elite—and popular—counter-revolution.〔Lewis (1993) p 38〕 ==Background== The political situation in Paris on the eve of the September Massacres was highly excited and aroused by dreadful rumors of traitors and foreign invaders.〔Tackett (2011)〕 On the evening of 9 August 1792, a Jacobin insurrection overthrew the leadership of the Paris Commune headed by Jérôme Pétion de Villeneuve and proclaimed a new revolutionary Commune headed by transitional authorities. The next day the insurrectionists stormed the Tuileries Palace. King Louis XVI fled with the royal family, and his authority as King was suspended by the Legislative Assembly; a ''de facto'' executive was named, but the actual power of decision-making rested with the new revolutionary Commune, whose strength resided in the mobilized ''sans-culottes'', the vast majority of Paris' fairly poor population. The 48 ''sections'' of Paris were fully equipped with munitions from the plundered arsenals in the days before the assault, substituting for the 60 National Guard battalions. Now, supported by a new armed force, the Commune and its ''sans-culottes'' took control of the city and dominated the Legislative Assembly and its decisions. For some weeks the Commune functioned as the actual government of France.〔Bergeron, Louis, ''Le Monde et son Histoire,'' Paris, 1970, Volume VII, Chapter VII, p. 324〕 The Commune took major steps towards democratizing the Revolution: the adoption of universal suffrage, the arming of the civilian population, absolute abolition of all remnants of noble privileges, the selling of the properties of the ''émigrés''. These events meant a change of direction from the political and constitutional perspective of the Girondists to a more social approach given by the Commune, as Cambon declared on 27 August: Besides these measures, the Commune engaged in a policy of political repression of all suspected counter-revolutionary activities. Beginning on 11 August, every Paris ''section'' named its committee of vigilance. Mostly these decentralized committees, rather than the Commune, brought about the repression of August and September 1792. From 15 to 25 August, around 500 detentions were registered. Half the detentions were made against non-juring priests, but even priests who had sworn the required oath were caught in the wave. In Paris, all monasteries were closed and the rest of the religious orders were dissolved by the law of 15 August.〔. Bergeron, p. 326〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「September Massacres」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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